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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

:

Supreme Court No. 14223

EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS,
INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
000O000

*

PETITION FOR REHEARING
*************

Plaintiff-respondent petitions the Court for a
rehearing in the instant case to consider two points which
plaintiff-respondent respectfully asserts constitute error
in the opinion of May 25, 1976:
I.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE

AT TRIAL WHICH COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOODS WHICH PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT SUPPLIED WERE UNMERCHANTABLE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
U.C.A. 70A-2-3-314 AND, THEREFORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED
TO MAKE A CASE FOR BREACH OF THIS IMPLIED WARRANTY WHICH COULD
GO TO A JURY.
II.

THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE,

U.C.A. 70A-2-315, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 1976.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

R. Jeffrey Taylor
Att^rn^ys^for' Plaintif f-Respondent
Sty6 W'Mkex B,ank Building
Silt/fakfc City, Utah 84111
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
•

000O000-

UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Supreme Court No. 14223

vs.
EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS,
INC. ,
Defendant and
Appellant.
000O000

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
*************

The Court, in an opinion filed May 25, 1976# reversed
the trial court's granting of a directed verdict for the
plaintiff.

In ordering a new trial on defendant's counterclaim/

the Court acted on, it is respectfully submitted, the mistaken
belief that certain aspects of the law of implied warranties
were applicable to the facts of the case.

Plaintiff petitions,

for reasons appearing in this Memorandum/ that the Court grant
a rehearing on this matter so that it might reconsider important
aspects of the law of implied warranties.
The Court will recall that this case deals with
defendant's counterclaim (lodged in response to plaintiff's suit
on open account) that plaintiff was liable in damages to defendant
for alleged contamination of processed hog feed.

Defendant's

counterclaim was based solely on theories of express and implied
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(
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(

warranties.

The Court, agreeing with defendant, stated, "The

evidence does not show that there was an express warranty by
the seller so as to bring the transaction within the provisions
of Section 70A-2-313, U.C.A. 1953."

Opinion at 2.

The Court, quoting from Sections 70A-2-314 and
70A-2-315, then proceeded to discuss the law of implied warranties,
reversed the order of directed verdict, and remanded for new
trial.

It is unclear from the opinion on which of the two

sections the Court relied for reversal, that of implied warranty
i

of merchantability or that of implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose.

Hence, this Petition discusses both warranties.

It is submitted that careful consideration of the record in this
case, in light of the true import of the sections on implied
warranties, leads to the conclusions that:

(a) defendant intro-

duced no evidence of the non-merchantability of the feed pellets;
and (b) the warranty of fitness for particular purpose simply
does not apply to situations of the sort here involved, where a
buyer directs a seller to supply the buyer with a particular
product of the buyer's direct specification, rather than "relying
on the buyerfs skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods."

(§ 70A-2-315)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WHICH COULD
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOODS WHICH PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT SUPPLIED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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WERE UNMERCHANTABLE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF U.C.A. 70A-2-314
AND, THEREFORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO MAKE A CASE FOR
BREACH OF THIS IMPLIED WARRANTY WHICH COULD GO TO A JURY.
As discussed in plaintifffs brief at pages 12-31,
defendant failed to make a case for thejury of breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability for three reasons, any of
which standing alone would suffice to lead properly to a directed
verdict for plaintiff.

This argument has been made, in brief

and in oral argument, and appears to have been unconvincing.
Regarding the first two factors, plaintiff here merely restates,
if with renewed conviction, its position:

(1) defendant pre-

sented no substantial evidence that the transaction was predominantly for the sale of goods, rather than for the pelletizing
service (combining the meat product provided by defendant with
plaintifff's grain product selected by defendant); and (2) defendant presented no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could
find that the contaminant, salmonella, was in plaintiff's
product at any time prior to its delivery to defendant.
If plaintiff's case for upholding the directed verdict
had rested on either or both of these grounds alone, the Court
could arguably be said to have correctly reversed the trial
court for its failure to examine evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion for directed
verdict was made and to resolve every controverted fact in its
favor.

For there was at least some evidence introduced, however

scanty and however unconvincing to the reasonable juror, that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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could lead to the conclusion that the transaction was predominantly for the sale of goods and that the product was contaminated
prior to delivery to defendant. 1/
It is clear from an examination of the record, however,
that defendant introduced no evidence whatever that plaintiff
breached the implied warranty of merchantabilityc

Section 70A-

2-314(2) quoted in part by the Court on page 2 of its opinion,
provides:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as (a) pass without objection in the
i
trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of
fair average quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used;
and (d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and (e) are adequately contained, packaged and labeled
as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the promises or affirmations of
fact made on the container or lable if any.
It is elementary that one relying on a warranty of
merchantability must establish that the goods supplied to him
were not merchantable.

To do so, such a party must show that

any one of the conditions of Section 70A-2-314(2) was not satisfied.

Defendant purportedly relied on an implied warranty of

merchantability, but it introduced no evidence whatever, let

1/ See Respondent's Brief on pages 21-25 for a description of
the lack of basis for the only evidence in the record supporting
defendant's claim of contamination at time of delivery.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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alone evidence arguably convincing to a reasonable juror, that
the "goods" supplied to it by the plaintiff were not merchantable
under the only law relevant, that embodied in Section 70A-2-314(2).
Indeed, the only evidence bearing on the criteria of merchantability surfaced in plaintiff's counsel's cross-examination of
two of defendant's witnesses.

In each instance, defendant's

witnesses themselves gave answers tending to establish the merchantability of the pelletized feed product, rather than its
non-merchantability, even if it did contain the degree of salmonella contamination at time of delivery that defendant asserted
in its complaint.

Such testimony included statements tending

to show the "goods" would "have passed without objection in the
trade under the contract description"' (see Tr. 109-110, plaintiff's
brief at 27); and that the "goods" were "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used" (see Tr. 192-194, plaintiff's
brief at 28-29) .
Because defendant introduced no evidence of the
pelletized feed product's unmerchantability, it is clear that
the Court's reversal of the directed verdict cannot properly
have been based on the claim of breach of implied warranty of
merchantability.

Reasonable minds are given no chance to differ

on a matter of fact concerning which no evidence has been put
before them.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6-

POINT II
THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, U.C.A. 70A-2315, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Although, as indicated supra, it is unclear from the
Opinion whether the Court relied, in reversing the order of
directed verdict, on the implied warranty of merchantability
or on the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose,
it appears more likely that the Court relied on the latte^r.
Both the evidence presented and the Court1s positioning of the
reference to the particular purpose warranty (just prior to
the concluding paragraph) indicate the likelihood of reliance
by the Court on this warranty theory, rather than on that of
merchantability.

Close examination of the evidence introduced,

in light of the wording and import of the particular fitness
warranty, indicates, nonetheless, that this warranty, like that
of merchantability, is not applicable as a matter of law to
the facts of this case.

The provision on implied warranty of

fitness for particular purpose, Section 70A-2-315 of the Utah
Code, provides:
When the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded
or modified under the next section,
an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit such purpose. (Emphasis
added)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court concluded that:
[i]n the view of the fact that there had
been a course of dealing between plaintiff
and the defendant for a period of approximately two years it must be inferred that
the plaintiff knew of the purpose to which
the feed was being put by the defendant.
Opinion at 2.
Whether this inference should be indulged, where no evidence
adduced at trial supports it, is questionable.

But further

pursuit of this particular problem is unnecessary, for the reason
that another aspect of the agreement makes very clear that the
particular purpose warranty is excluded as a matter of law in
this case.

The words of the section itself make clear the

absolute requirement/ for the implied warranty to attach, that
the buyer must rely on the seller's skill or judgment to select
or furnish suitable goods.

Defendant has conceded, in its brief

and through its witnesses, that it did not rely on plaintiff's
skill or judgment.

Defendant obtained a standard formula from

a third party and submitted it to plaintiff for plaintiff's
application, and further specified that the processed hog feed
was to come only from plaintiff's Orem feed mill, the very mill
which had processed, according to the same exact formula, feed
bought from plaintiff for a number of years preceding the time
of the relevant transaction.

Defendant's brief at 3, Tr. 15-17, 19.

It thus becomes clear, even from defendant's version
of the facts, that defendant in no way relied on plaintiff's
skill and judgment in selecting or furnishing suitable goods.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On the contrary, plaintiff was obliged under contract to provide
a product conforming to defendants specifications.

If plaintiff

had failed to comply with this condition, it would likely have
incurred contract liability for breach.

Thus to hold plaintiff

liable to defendant, in this situation, on a particular purpose
warranty theory would have been to construct around the plaintiff
a double bind.

Damned if it complies with the specifications,

damned if it does not.

Defendant clearly chose not to rely on

plaintiff's skill and judgment in selecting grain products with
which defendant's own meat products would be combined to form
the pellets for consumption, or in selecting the formula according to which the products would be combined, or in furnishing
the product to defendant.

Plaintiff agreed to, and in fact did,

act precisely in accord with defendant's specifications.
An Official Comment to the Uniform Commercial Code
section on particular purpose warranty, case law from other
jurisdictions, and Utah case law itself all echo the conclusion
appearing from a direct reading of the statute and from common
sense considerations, that the implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-315 deals with the
elimination from the old Uniform Sales Act "patent or other
trade name" exception to particular purpose warranty.

The

purpose of the elmination was to make it clear that mere reference in the contract to a particular brand of product will not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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work of itself to nullify the warranty.

The drafters of the

U.C.C. realized that the seller may have recommended the
product as adequate for the buyer's purpose prior to the contract's
execution.

It is the reliance by the buyer, in conjunction with

or apart from the seller's recommendations, on the seller's
skill or judgment, that triggers the particular purpose warranty.
Nonetheless, Comment 5 states, relevant to our situation:
If the buyer himself is insisting on a
particular brand he is not relying on
the seller's skill and judgment and so
no warranty results. (Emphasis added.)
*
It is clear that the instant case involves a buyer's insistence
on a particular product rather than its reliance on the seller's
judgment to select or furnish a suitable product.
The test of when a warranty of fitness for particular
purpose will be held to have been implied has perhaps most
clearly been stated as follows:
The distinction between the cases in which
a warranty is implied and where it is not
implied is that in one case a person buys
a distinct thing, an exact article, and
gets the thing he bargained for. He cannot
complain that it does not accomplish the
purposes for which he purchased, although
he communicated that purpose to the seller.
In such cases he takes his own risk as to
the fitness of the thing for the intended
purpose and no warranty is implied. . . .
The other case is where one buys an article
to be used for a certain purpose, and the
seller undertakes to furnish him the article
required. . . . The distinction is between
the manufacture and supply of an article to
satisfy a required purpose, and the manufacture or supply of a specified, described,
and defined article. In one case there is
an implied warranty, and in the other there
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
is Digitized
none.
American
Player
Piano
Co.
v.BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4
(The fact that this case was decided well before the promulgation
and enactment of the U.C.C. does not render outdated its explanation of the law of implied warranty.

The focus of the court's

analysis makes clear that then controlling common law warranty
law was similar in import to the clear meaning of U.C.A. § 70-2-315).
In another case, one in which the court held that there was no

•

implied warranty of fitness in a sale of a defective loaf of
bread, Justice Cordozo wrote, "there can be no inference of
reliance where the buyer selects the brand and gets what he
selects."

.

Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175

N.E. 105, 106 (1931).

And in a recent case the Tenth Circuit,

applying Utah law, observed that goods manufactured to a buyer's
specifications are not supplied with an implied warranty of
fitness, "where the buyer furnishes precise technical specifications."

Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp.

451 F.2d

1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1971).
The Utah case most similar to the instant case, on
the particular purpose warranty questions, is Landes Co. v. Fallows,
81 U. 432, 19 P.2d 389 (1933).

There plaintiff sued to recover

the unpaid balance of a promissory note delivered in part payment
for certain second hand farm machinery.

The defendant-warranty

claimant specified certain parts that were to be incorporated
in the machinery which plaintiff was to supply.

The defendant

offered to prove that the parts specified were defective.

The

court held, inter alia, "there is no warranty of fitness where
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the buyer orders a specific article for a specific purpose known
to the seller."

19 P.2d at 391-392. The Utah Supreme Court

has adverted to this aspect of warranty law on three other
occasions, in Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Paramount
Baking Co., 88 U. 67, 39 P.2d 323 (1934); in Carver V. Donn, 117
U. 180, 214 P.2d 118 (1950); and in Finlayson v. Brady, 121 U.
204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952).

In each of these cases, all involving

contractual specifications of certain products by brand name,
the Court rejected the claims that such brand name specification
i

had done away with the element of reliance by buyer on seller's
skill or judgment.

Representative of the particular fitness

warranty law in effect at the times of those decisions was
U.C.A. § 81-1-15 (1943), quoted in the Carver case.

The statute

provided, in pertinent part:
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment. . .there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for such purpose.
(Note that the reliance element is practically identical to that
of the present statute.)

None of these cases abrogates or subtracts

from the rule announced in the Fallows case.

Rather than doing

away with the rule that there can be no implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose when the buyer affirmatively specifies
the article he wants, the cases stand for the principle that was
later to appear in Official Comment 5 (discussed, supra) to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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U.C.C. § 2-315, that the mere fact that the contract calls for
the supplying of a product of a particular brand does not
dictate the conclusion that there was no reliance and hence no
warranty.

The rule of the Fallows case is applicable here, where

the contract between plaintiff and defendant did not merely
include a brand name that was suggested to buyer by seller, a
brand name whose mention was initiated by buyer because it
happened to occur to him as a generic term, representative of
the kind of product he thought he wanted (Carver case).

If that

1

had been the case, defendant would have been situated similarly
to the warranty claimant in Carver, one who had, despite the desi
nation in the contract of a product by name, in fact relied on
the seller's skill or judgment to provide a product suitable
for his particular purpose.

But the record in the instant case

clearly indicates that there was no such reliance by defendant,
but rather that defendant, having at least as much expertise in
the area of product selection as plaintiff, acted affirmatively
to have included in the contract for sale exact specifications
for manufacture of the product for which it bargained.

Plaintiff

was given no choice in selection; it was required to, and in fact
did, provide precisely what defendant ordered.

In such case, as

the foregoing discussion makes clear, there can as a matter
of law be implied no warranty of fitness for particular purpose.
CONCLUSION
Because there was absolutely no evidence introduced
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the goods supplied by plaintiff were not merchantable, the
defendant made no case before the jury on a theory of breach
of implied warranty of merchantability.

Because defendant could

not, on its own statement of relevant facts, have relied on the
plaintiff's skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing the
"goods" involved, the warranty of fitness for particular
purpose is not applicable in this case.

The Court's opinion

on the facts, although plaintiff strongly asserts that a careful
reading of the record does not support it, does not require that
the directed verdict be set aside:
We are of the opinion that in this case there
were circumstances shown in the evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find that the
contamination contained in the feed came from
the components furnished by the plaintiff or
that the contamination was a result of plaintiff! s preparation of the feed and that contamination resulted from the processing.
Opinion at 3.
As the foregoing argument makes clear, even if the
record contained evidence of contamination at the time of delivery,
defendant failed to introduce any evidence at trial that the alleged
contamination rendered the feed unmerchantable.

The only evidence

adduced indicated that the feed was merchantable within the
purview of Section 2-314.

The argument also makes clear that,

as a matter of law, no warranty of fitness for particular purpose
can be implied pursuant to Section 2-315 where the record demonstrates a complete absence of buyer reliance and an abundance of
buyer specifications.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court has correctly ruled there was no express
warranty-

Defendant's case rests, as it must, solely on an

implied warranty theory.

Defendant failed, as a matter of law,

to make a case for the jury.

Rendering justice within the law

as well as adding another carefully written page to the welldeveloping Utah case law on implied warranties requires, it is
respectfully submitted, reinstatement of the trial court's
directed verdict.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 1976.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES to Philip C. Patterson, Attorney for Defendant Egbert-
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Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc., 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401,
this 28th day of June, 1976.
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